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The  expansion  of  markets  –globalization–  was  reversed  during 
early 20th century and unfettered markets gave in to the welfare state 
and central planning. But the markets have been striking back since the 
early 1980s. Governments are withdrawn from economic activities, and 
many structural market reforms are implemented. Now the question is: 
Can  the  forces  that  market  expansion  create  again  reverse  this 
expansion? This paper seeks an answer to this question by constructing 
an  evolutionary  game  theoretical  framework  in  which  market  and 
“egalitarian” societies appear as evolutionarily stable states and shows 
that catastrophic events such as the Great Depression can indeed cause 
switch over between evolutionarily stable states.  
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The first wave of the globalization had started in the second half of the 
19th century.
1 The formation of the gold standard as the world monetary 
system and elimination of the controls over the international movements 
of capital, labour and goods–which were already low compared to the 
interwar  period–helped  the  emergence  of  the  global  economy. 
Throughout the 19th century, world merchandise trade increased rapidly 
by the help of the decline in transportation and communication costs. 
International  mobility  of  labour  and  capital  had  all  increased 
dramatically and the capital markets became steadily more integrated 
during this period.  
The expansion of markets came to a halt with the First World War. 
After the war, attempts to rebuild global economy based on a renewed 
gold standard failed because of the political pressures of working class 
parties  and  rising  social  spendings.
2  Unemployment  in  developed 
countries soared and output declined. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
increased  doubts  about  the  efficiency  of  markets  as  an  efficient 
allocation mechanism of the resources. Governments began to intervene 
to markets boldly and sometimes desperately. One of the first areas of 
intervention was the international trade: during the 1930s trade barriers 
proliferated. As a result, the growth rate of international trade among the 
industrialized nations fell drastically. Countries adopted capital controls 
to avoid currency crisis and outflow of gold. Monetary policies became 
an instrument of beggar -thy-neighbour devaluations.  Capital markets 
which already began to recede in 19 20s collapsed in 1930s. Labour  
migration also fell down. 
Between 1917 and 1950 many countries broke away from markets 
and switched over to central planning. In 1950 almost a third of the 
world population was living in centrally planned economies under a 
                                                 
1 For competing views about to the question “when did globalization begin?”, see: O’Rourke and 
Williamson 2000. 
2 Eichengreen (1996: 4) summarizes the situation quite well: “Universal male suffrage and the 
rise of trade unionism and parliamentary labor parties politicized monetary and fiscal policy 
making.” 3 
 
socialist party rule (The World Bank 1996). Many of the developing 
countries used planning as a basis for their development strategy and 
adopted industrialization policies based on import substitution and trade 
restrictions. Even industrialized countries such as the U.K. or Norway 
used planning at various levels. In industrialized countries, the welfare 
state began to rise. 
The second wave of the globalization had a slow start in 1960s but 
gained  momentum  in  the  1980s.  After  the  collapse  of  the    Bretton 
Woods system in the early 1970s international capital flows began to 
rise and reached very high levels.  International trade also increased very 
rapidly.  
In 1990s, after the collapse of the communism, centrally planned 
economies of the Eurasia switched back to market economy. In many 
developing  countries  so-called  market  friendly  reforms  are 
implemented:  state-owned  enterprises  are  privatized,  markets  are 
deregulated and governments’ interventions to markets are restricted. In 
order to limit the responsiveness of the monetary and fiscal policies to 
the  short  term  economic  objectives,  central  banks  are  given 
independence and governments tied their hands by “fiscal discipline”. In 
terms of economic policies the line separating right and left political 
parties faded away.  
Even  if  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the  overall  record  of  market 
expansion on growth, inequality and poverty
3, one can still argue that, 
generally  speaking,  the  experiment  with  planning  created  more 
egalitarian outcomes at the cost of eco nomic efficiency (World Bank 
1996:  2).  However,  economic  efficiency  does  not  solve  all  of  the 
economic problems.  It  is becoming  clear that to reduce poverty and 
decrease income inequality within the  market economies redistribution 
schemes are necessary (Harrison, 2006). Whether these schemes can be 
                                                 
3 As to the differing positions, see Krueger (1997), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) for growth 
Maddison (2001), O’Rourke (2001), Boltho and Toniolo (1999), Lindert and Williamson (2001), 
Bourguignon (2005), and Sala-i-Martin (2002) for inequality; Bhalla (2002), Sala-i-Martin 
(2002), Chen and Ravallion (2008), Bourguignon (2005), Lindert and Williamson (2001) for 
poverty. 4 
 
realized  or  not  within  the  parameters  of  markets  will  determine  the 
evolution of the globalization. In respect of a decline in growth rates or 
further deterioration of income inequality within countries, the relevant 
question is: can anti-globalization forces gain enough power to reverse 
the expansion of markets as it happened in the first half of the 20th 
century? 
The  present  paper  seeks  to  find  an  answer  to  this  question  of 
reversal  through  building  an  asymmetric  evolutionary  game  theoretic 
model which aims at examining the dynamics of globalization. Section 1 
gives a brief account on markets and their limitations. Section 2 presents 
an  asymmetric  evolutionary  game  theoretical  model  in  which  market 
and  “egalitarian”  societies  are  represented  by  the  evolutionary  stable 
states,  and  conditions  for  a  reversal  of  the  market  expansion  is  also 
considered. And a brief conclusion will follow. 
 
1.  Markets: A Brief Assessments 
The worldwide expansion of markets –globalization– at the expense of 
other  economic  and  social  institutions  alters  and  modifies  the  rules 
governing investment, production and distribution decisions, and  affects 
well-being of every individual on earth and raises uncertainty in their 
daily lives.  
Economic  polices,  one  way  or  another,  affect  the  expansion  of 
markets.  In  fact,  they  can  be  broadly  categorized  according  to  their 
stance to markets. On the one hand we have the neo-liberal policies that 
support  the  expansion  of  markets  to  increase  overall  efficiency  and 
foster  economic  growth.  The  policy  guidelines  referred  as  the 
Washington Consensus or “market friendly” economic reforms fall in 
this category. International organizations such as the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO steer member countries to follow policies that support the 
expansion of markets. On the other hand we have Keynesian, social-
democrat or socialist economic policies that intervene into markets in 
order to obtain socially more acceptable or equitable outcomes. From 5 
 
the  welfare  state  to  central  planning,  these  economic  policies  aim  to 
limit the markets or alter their outcomes.  
Markets,  if  they  function  adequately,  provide  individuals 
opportunity to use their endowments productively to enhance their well-
being. Expansion of markets increases those opportunities available to 
individuals.  But  even  in  the  most  developed  markets,  information 
asymmetries,  incomplete  contracts,  transaction  costs,  and  imperfect 
competition  can  all  hinder  the  efficiency  of  the  outcome  of  market 
transactions.  Furthermore,  unequal  bargaining  power  in  market 
transactions generates outcomes that depend on strategic behaviour of 
interacting individuals (Bowles 1998, Bowles and Gintis 1988). Markets 
provide opportunities but individuals have different abilities to exploit 
these  opportunities.  Since  participation  in  market  interactions  is 
voluntary, everybody is supposed to be better off. But gains from market 
exchanges need not be distributed to everybody’s satisfaction. 
Moreover, uncertainty is a fact of life. Each decision involves some 
degree  of  risk.  No  economic  system  can  eliminate  all  risks  that 
individuals  face.  But  expansion  of  markets  raises  uncertainty  that 
individuals  tackle  in  their  daily  lives  and  feeds  anxiety.  Financial 
liberalization increases the risk of loosing all savings in a crisis, and 
financial  crises  are  very  costly  for  the  poor  (Harrison  2006).  Trade 
liberalization  affects  the  distribution  of  employment  across  countries. 
Some people loose their jobs because their firms cannot compete with 
their foreign counterparts. Market shares decline and profits evaporate 
because of a new product, developed by a rival firm, enters the market. 
Market  mechanism  may  increase  overall  economic  efficiency  by 
eliminating losers and picking up winners. But this is hardly comforting 
for  those  who  are  on  the  loosing  side.  Risk-averse  people  demand 
security from their governments but governments’ ability to meet these 
demands  are  becoming  increasingly  restricted  because  of  fiscal 
discipline imposed upon them. Those unmet demands may be a source 
of political tensions that can stop or reverse the expansion of markets 6 
 
(Rodrik  1997,  Scheve  and  Slaughter  2002,  Mayda,  O’Rourke  and 
Sinnott 2007). 
Expansion  of  markets  may  generate  a  Pareto  improvement  if 
winners can adequately compensate losers. Accomplishment of such a 
compensatory redistribution scheme may help to calm down people who 
are on the loosing side of the market expansion. Such a redistribution 
scheme –welfare state– is nevertheless proven to be difficult to sustain 
especially without distorting incentive mechanism that markets largely 
rely on to function properly (Bowles 1992, Alesina and Perotti 1994).  
 Actually, it is not just a matter of loosing or winning. Economic 
growth raises everbody’s life standards in the long run. But people also 
care  about  fairness,  especially  when  it  comes  to  the  distribution  of 
income and wealth. If market outcomes contradict what is considered as 
“fair” or “just” this alone can be a cause for discomfort and suboptimal 
behaviour (Akerlof 1980, Dobbs and Molho 1999, Fehr and Schmidt 
1999, Gaechter and Fehr 1999).  
 
2.  A Two-Player Model of Social Interactions 
In this section, we present an asymmetric evolutionary game theoretic 
model  in  which  evolutionarily  stable  states  corresponds  to  different 
institutional structures of the society.  
Consider  a  population  of  n  individuals,  where  n  is  large. 
Individuals have the same preferences but differ in their physical and 
mental abilities which are not perfectly observable by others. We will 
refer to those abilities as productive capacity or initial endowment which 
will  be  denoted  for  an  individual  i  by  i Z .  Initial  endowments  are 
distributed randomly among the individuals. The differences in initial 
endowments represent nature’s inequalities. These inequalities are the 
source of hierarchical relations and unequal bargaining power among the 
members of the population. They also determine the roles played by the 
individuals in social interactions and affect choice of actions as well as 
the outcome of the interaction. 7 
 
The  objective  of  each  individual  is  to  use  her  endowment  to 
enhance her well-being (fitness). We assume that the well-being of an 
individual  depends  on  goods  she  consumes  and  endowment  she 
conserves.  Consumption  good  can  be  obtained  by  working,  and 
endowment can be conserved by not working.  
  At the beginning of each period, members of the population paired 
randomly to negotiate on the terms of cooperation. If they agree, they 
work together to produce a composite consumption good, otherwise they 
work  alone.  The  agreement  between    paired  individuals  involves  the 
distribution rule, and the contribution rate.  
Let  i   denotes the contribution rate, in other words the fraction of 
initial endowment allocated for work by individual i  ) 1 0 (   i  . Then, 
endowment  used for work by individual i  can be expressed as  i iZ  . 
Since initial endowments are not perfectly observable it is reasonable to 
assume that the actual contribution rate may be lower than the terms of 
agreement indicates. 
   Let  the  amount  of  consumption  good  that  can  be  produced  by 
working be a function of endowment. If individual i  works alone we 
have 
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where Q is the amount of consumption good measured in fitness unit. If 
we assume that contribution of consumption good and not working to 
well-being is additively seperable, then well-being of individual i who 
works alone can be expressed as   
 
  i i i i Q Z w    ) 1 (  ,  
 
where  i i Z ) 1 (    is also measured in fitness unit.  8 
 
  If the individuals agree to work together well-being of individual i 
who works with individual j can be written as   
 
  ij i i i i Q Z w      ) 1 ( E ,    .   
 
where        E   is the expectation operator, and  ) , ( j j i i ij Z Z Q Q    . The 
outcome of cooperation is a random variable because endowments are 
not  perfectly  observable,  and  assumed  contribution  rate  cannot  be 
completely enforced. We will omit the expectation operator in order to 
limit the notational burden. 
Cooperation increases the total amount of consumption good that 
can be consumed but it also brings conflict of interest between members 
of the population. Since the initial endowments are given, total output 
can be increased only by raising the amount of endowment allocated for 
work. Given the total output, an individual can enhance her well-being 
only by demanding a higher share. Given the share, well-being can be 
improved by lowering the level of contribution to work but this will also 
lower  the  total  output.  This  conflict  of  interest  allows  us  to  refer 
individuals as the players of “the game of life”
4. 
Given that endowments are distributed randomly, in each random 
matching,  every  player  finds  herself  in  one  of  two  positions:  high 
endowment  (role  I) with probability     and  low  endowment  (role  II) 
with  probability   1 .  Having  high  or  low  endowment  is  identified 
according to relative endowments of the paired individuals. We assume 
that although the endowment levels are not perfectly observable, players 
can  perceive  their  differences  in  endowments.  This  perceived 
asymmetry influences players’ choice of strategy and their payoffs.  
We will assume that both players have two strategies: They may 
choose the distribution rule or choose the contribution rate. Although 
many distributional schemes can be envisioned we will consider two 
                                                 
4 Binmore (1994: 6). 9 
 
distribution  rules:  Market  rule  and  the  egalitarian  rule  to  represent  a 
redistribution  scheme.  Under  the  market  rule  players  get  shares 
according to  their  contributions  to  output. Under the egalitarian rule: 
players get equal shares.
5 We will denote the output share of each player 
under the egalitarian distribution rule by  W  , and the high-endowment 
player’s output share under the market rule by  M  .  
We distinguish contribution rates of players by a superscript: for 
example  H   the high-endowment player’s contribution rate. We assume 
that when a player’s  preferred  distribution rule is  played,  this  player 
contributes  all of  her endowment  to  work, for example when  M    is 
played  1  H  .  Note  that  market  rule  is  the  preferred  by  the  high-
endowment player, because  W M    . Since  W M     ) 1 ( , the low-
endowment player prefers the egalitarian rule. 
In each matching there are four possible outcomes for each player: 
i. If both  players play  distribution rules (i.e., high-endowment  player 
plays  M   and low-endowment player plays W  ), no deal will be made 
and they end up with working alone. Then the well-being of the players 
in role I and role II are   
 
) ( ) 1 (
I
11 H H H H Z Q Z w       and  ) ( ) 1 (
II
11 L L L L Z Q Z w      ,  
 
where  H Z   and  L Z   denotes  high-  and  low-endowment  players’ 
endowment levels.  
  ii. If player in role I plays M  , and player in role II plays  L  , the 
well-being of the players in role I and role II are   
 
  ) , (
I
12 L L H M Z Z Q w     and  ) , (
II
12 L H H W Z Z Q w     
                                                 
5 The market rule raises efficiency in social interactions by rewarding higher contributions but 
preserves nature’s inequalities which  are  reflected  in  differences in  initial  endowments.  The 
egalitarian  rule eliminates nature’s inequalities by rewarding equal shares to the participants. 
The market rule can be qualified as fair because shares reflect relative contributions. Egalitarian 




  iii. If player in role I plays  H  , and player in role II plays  W  , 
the well-being of the players in role I and role II are  
 
) , ( ) 1 (
I
21 L H H W H H Z Z Q Z w        
and  
 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
II
21 L L H M L L Z Z Q Z w        . 
 
  iv. Finally if both players play effort level, we assume that output 
will be shared by after work negotiation. In this case, the well-being of 
the players in role I and role II are  
 
) , ( ) 1 (
I




) , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
II
22 L L H H N L L Z Z Q Z w          
 
where  N   is the high-endowment player’s output share settled by after-
work negotiation, and we assume that  W N    . 
Payoff matrices for players in role I and role II are denoted by 
I W  
and 
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Since each individual can find herself in different position in each 
matching,  the  population  will  consists  of  four  types  (or  behavioural 
strategies):  11 
 
) , ( 1 W M T    : play distribution rule in both roles,  
) , ( 2 L M T    : play distribution rule in role I, play contribution rate 
in  
         role II,  
)   , ( 3 L H T    : play contribution rate in both roles, 
) , ( 4 W H T    : play contribution rate in role I, play distribution 
rule in  
         role II. 
Contributing  high  and  demanding  less  may  be  called  altruistic 
behaviour.  Similarly,  contributing  less  and  demanding  more  may  be 
called  selfish  behaviour.  But  none  of  the  types  listed  above  fit  these 
definitions  given  the  assumptions  about  the  players’  strategies.  For 
example, consider  1 T  individuals. When they play the distribution rule 
they contribute all of their endowments. Contributing everything can be 
considered as an altruistic act in role I because it implies no self use of 
initial endowment. Meanwhile playing the distribution rule in role II can 
be considered  as selfish because it demands a  higher share of output 
relative  to  the  contribution.    Furthermore,  two  types  use  the  same 
strategy in one role and different one in the other. For example,  1 T  and 
2 T  play the distribution rule in role I,  3 T  and  4 T  play effort level in role 
I. In short, there is no type (behavioural strategy) that can be described 
as purely selfish or altruistic. 
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Let  ) (t f   denote  the  state  of  the  population  at  time  t,  then  type 
frequencies  i f  belong to the simplex  4 S , where 
 
          4 ,..., 1 , 0 , 1 : )) ( ),..., ( ( ) (
4
4 1 4 i      f   f t f t f t S i i f  
 
Suppose the success of a behavioural strategy is a function of the 
difference between the fitness of type  i T  and the average fitness of the 
population.  Let  the  fitness  of  the  type  i T   in  terms  of  frequencies  be 
given as  
j
j ij i f w W ) ( f , and the average fitness of the population as 
f fW . Then, the evolution of the frequencies of the behavioural strategies 
can be modelled by a differential equation on the simplex  4 S  which is 
given by the replicator equation 
 
    f f f W W f f i i i   ) (   
 
where  i f   denotes the change in the frequency of type  i T . The rate of 
change  i i f f /   measures the evolutionary success of the type  i T . If it is 
positive, it indicates that the fitness of  i T  is above the average and the 
frequency of the behavioural strategy  i T  within the population rises.  
An interior rest point is obtained from the solutions of 
 
    4 3 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( f f f f W W W W     
 
    1 4 3 2 1     f f f f  
 
satisfying  0  i f   for  . 4 ,... 1  i   There  may  be  none,  one  or  infinite 
solution.  Instead  of  trying  to  solve  these  equations  we  are  going  to 
analyze  qualitative  behaviour  of  the  dynamic  system.  Following 13 
 
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998:  124) we rewrite the well-being (fitness) 
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21 ) 1 ( w w s     . We assume that 
i.  0  R   and  0  r . That is payoff to the both players are higher 
under the egalitarian distribution rule than the working alone, 
ii. 0  S   and  0  s  if  the  payoff  to  the both  players  are higher 
under  the  market  distribution  rule  than  the  share  won  after-work 
negotiation.  
Under  these  assumptions  player  in  role  I  prefers  the  egalitarian 
distribution rule to working alone, and the market distribution rule to 
fighting. The player in role II prefers the egalitarian distribution rule to 
working  alone  and  market  distribution  rule  to  fighting.  Hence,  these 
assumptions  allow  us  to  rule  out  1 T   and  3 T   as  evolutionary  stable 
strategies.  The  remaining  behavioural  strategies  2 T   and    4 T   are  the 
candidates for evolutionary stable strategies.
6 Let us denote the average 
well-being  in  terms  of  consumption  goods  by  ) ( i T W   in  each 










21 4 ) 1 ( ) ( w w T W      . 
 
                                                 
6 Technically this is the bistability case in which there is a line of rest points in the interior. In 
this case all initial conditions lead to one of the two candidates for evolutionary stable states.  14 
 
When  2 T  beats  4 T  we have  ) ( ) ( 4 2 T W T W   . We call this evolutionary 
stable state as the market society. If the inequality changes direction  4 T  
beats  2 T , and we have  ) ( ) ( 4 2 T W T W  . We call this evolutionary stable 
state as the egalitarian society. Note that since   ) ( 2 T W and  ) ( 4 T W  are  
continuous functions of  L   and  H   for given ,  M  ,    H Z , and  L Z  we 
have  ) ( ) ( 4 2 T W T W  at some  *  . Figure 1 depicts the outcome of the 




In  the  figure  left  vertical  axes  measures  the  share  of  the  high-
endowment player’s under the market distribution rule, and right vertical 
axes  measures  the  outcome  of  the  cooperation  under  the  egalitarian 
distribution rule. We measure  L   from left to the right and  H   from 
) , ( L H H W W Z Z Q    
) ( ) ( 2 4 T W T W    ) ( ) ( 4 2 T W T W   
L    H   
Figure 1 
*   
) , ( L L H M M Z Z Q    
M Q   W Q  15 
 
right  to  the  left.  The  length  of  the  horizontal  axes  equals  to  1 
because 1 , 0   L H   . The distance from left to  *   gives us the range 
where  the  amount  of  socially  produced  goods  is  higher  under  the 
egalitarian rule than the market rule. Any cause that increases this range 
also increases the probability of emerging the egalitarian society as the 
evolutionary stable state. Note also that while the well-being under the 
market rule depends upon the contribution rate of the low-endowment 
player  the  opposite  is  valid  under  the  egalitarian  rule.  When  the 
contribution  rate  of  low-endowment  player  rises  above  *    the  well-
being  of  the  behavioural  strategy  2 T   exceeds  that  of  4 T   and  market 
society  emerges as  an evolutionarily stable state. Similarly, when the 
contribution rate of high-endowment player rises above  *   (note that 
we measure  H   from left to the right) the well-being of the behavioural 
strategy  4 T  exceeds that of  2 T  and the egalitarian society emerges as an 
evolutionarily stable state.  
An increase in the market share of the low-endowment player (a 
decline in inequality in terms of consumption goods) causes the curve 
given by  ) , ( L L H M M Z Z Q   to turn clockwise. In this case the critical 
value  *   shifts to 
the right,  and the support given by the low-endowment player to the 
market society rises. The reverse is also true. 
Until  now  we  assumed  that  each  player’s  contribution  rate  is  1 
under their preferred distribution rule. When we relax this assumption, 
for instance when the contribution rate of the high-endowment player to 
the  market  society  gets  lower,  then  the  curve  given  by 
) , ( L L H M M Z Z Q    turns clockwise (The same is also true for a decline 
in ).  In  this  case  *   shifts  to  the  right,  and  this  also  increases  the 
probability  of  the  emergence  of  the  egalitarian  society  as  the 





Karl Polanyi (1944) once argued that the market expansion is reversed 
by the forces it created and the state will play the dominant role in the 
economy in the future. Events proved him right for a while but later the 
markets begin to strike back. Now the question is that “can the forces 
that market expansion created again reverse this expansion and replace 
market institutions with other social institutions to create more equitable 
outcomes?”  
In an evolutionary game theoretical framework we presented a role 
game in order to seek an answer to this question. In the model players 
find  themselves  in  different  position  in  social  interactions  and  this 
asymmetry  brings  them  the  opportunity  to  use  different  strategies  in 
each  position.  Under  these  assumptions  the  society  consists  of  four 
behavioural strategies (types) and none of those behavioural strategies 
can be characterized as purely egoist (self-regarding) or altruistic. Due 
to  the  inherent  asymmetries  in  social  interactions  we  believe  that 
focusing  on  behavioural  strategies  rather  than  players  provide  more 
appropriate foundation for economic, social or political considerations. 
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this feature of the model is 
novel in explicitly mixing homo economicus with homo egalis (or homo 
reciprocan).
7  
In the model we restricted the strategy space t o contribution rates 
and  distribution  rules  in  social  interactions.  While  this  restriction 
drastically simplifies the model it also helps to focus on efficiency and 
inequality issues which are crucial of the survival of any economic and 
social system.  
In the model we showed that m arket and egalitarian societies are 
the evolutionarily stable states and  we also showed that  catastrophic 
shocks such as the Great Depression (a decline in L  ) or an increase in 
inequality  (an  increase  in M  )  can  indeed  cause  switches  between 
evolutionarily  stable  states.  In  other  words,  the  results  of  the  model 
                                                 
7 Binmore (1994: 25), Gintis (2000: ch. 11). 17 
 
presented  indicate  that  the  market  society  is  not  the  globally 
evolutionary stable state of the game of life.  
Of  course  one  should  not  make  strong  statements  about  the 
evolution  of human societies based on  a simple model. But  from an 
evolutionary perspective, in the long run what matters are the numbers. 
If losers of the market expansion outweighs the winners in numbers this 
will eventually be reflected in economic policies and institutions, and 
have a negative effect on the expansion of markets. In other words, if the 
costs of the expansion of markets exceed its benefits for the majority or 
for the politically powerful then we may witness a reversal in the market 
expansion in favour of other economic and social institutions. First half 
of the 20th century provides an example of such a reversal and there is 
no guarantee that it may not happen again. 
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